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To the Editor: Since the 
Global Polio Eradication Initiative 
was launched in 1988, indigenous 
transmission of wild poliovirus 
(WPV) has been interrupted in 
all countries except Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Nigeria (1). However, 
during 2003–2011, outbreaks resulting 
from importation of WPV occurred 
in 29 previously polio-free countries 
in Africa, including Central African 
Republic (CAR) (1–3). In 2011, 350 
WPV cases were reported from 12 
countries in Africa, a 47% decrease 
from the 657 cases reported by 12 
countries in Africa in 2010 (1). 
In CAR, the last case of 
poliomyelitis caused by indigenous 
transmission of wild poliovirus was 
reported in 2000, but importation of 
WPV type 1 has been reported (4). We 
describe the importation of WPV1 and 
WPV3 into CAR during successive 
events in 2008, 2009, and 2011.
To investigate importation of 
WPV into CAR, we conducted a 
study using fecal samples collected 
from patients in CAR who had acute 
flaccid paralysis (AFP) during 2008–
2011. The samples were analyzed for 
virus isolation, typing, and intratypic 
differentiation at the Regional 
Reference Laboratory for Polio, 
Institut Pasteur de Bangui, using 
World Health Organization (WHO) 
standard procedures (5). Isolated 
WPV strains were sent to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
(Atlanta, Georgia, USA) or the 
National Institute for Communicable 
Diseases (Johannesburg, South 
Africa) for sequencing according to 
WHO guidelines (6–8). Cases were 
classified as laboratory confirmed or 
polio-compatible according to WHO 
recommendations; a polio-compatible 
case was defined as AFP for which 
stool samples were not adequate or a 
situation in which the patient was lost 
to follow up or had residual paralysis 
60 days after testing.
Of 141 AFP cases from 2008, 
three, from Bangui, Ouham, and Ouaka 
districts, were laboratory confirmed as 
WPV1; this cluster was designated 
B2D1B (Figure). Sequencing results 
showed that the virus in this cluster 
belonged to the South Asia A (Indian) 
genotype, which was circulating in 
Angola and Democratic Republic of 
Congo at that time (Figure). 
Of 163 AFP cases from 2009, 
14 in Ouham-Pende district were 
laboratory confirmed as WPV3; this 
cluster was designated D2B2B1. 
Sequencing results showed that the 
virus in this cluster belonged to 
West Africa B genotype, which was 
circulating in Nigeria and southern 
Chad at that time (Figure). 
Of 142 AFP cases from 2011, 
four in Ouham district were laboratory 
confirmed as WPV1; this cluster was 
designated I6C2B4C1A2. Sequencing 
results showed that the virus in this 
cluster belonged to West Africa 
B genotype, which was circulating 
in south Chad and Nigeria at the 
time (Figure).
The importation of wild poliovirus 
strains into CAR appeared to follow 
3 different routes. In 2008, WPV1 
originated from Democratic Republic 
of Congo and was first detected in the 
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Figure.	 Clusters	 of	 polio	 cases	 caused	 by	 wild	 poliovirus	 importations,	 Central	African	
Republic,	2008–2011.	Each	circle	represents	1	case	of	acute	flaccid	paralysis	confirmed	
as	polio.	Black	circles,	cluster	B2D1B,	2008	poliovirus	(PV)	type	1	SOAS	importation	from	




the southern part of the country. Two 
more cases were detected in 2 other 
districts, in the north (Ouham) and 
in the middle (Ouaka) of the country. 
During that year, 2 AFP cases were 
classified as polio-compatible; these 
cases originated from Haute Kotto 
and Ouham districts. In 2008, routine 
coverage of oral polio vaccine (OPV) 
was 45%, 33%, and 57% for Bangui and 
Sanitary Regions 3 and 4, respectively. 
(Sanitary regions are equivalent to 
provinces and have several districts 
under their jurisdiction; Bangui 
is considered a Sanitary Region 
containing 8 districts.) To interrupt 
wild poliovirus circulation, health 
authorities implemented 4 rounds of 
national immunization days, 2 using 
monovalent OPV (mOPV) type 1 
and 2 using trivalent OPV; 1 local 
immunization day using mOPV1 was 
also instituted.
In 2009, WPV3 was imported from 
southern Chad to the Ouham-Pende 
district in CAR. This insecure district 
is difficult to access, but routine OPV 
coverage was reported as 61% for 2009, 
compared with the country’s official 
OPV coverage of 55%. The apparently 
higher coverage in areas of insecurity 
is likely the result of inaccurate target 
population estimates. Five additional 
AFP cases were classified as polio-
compatible; these occurred in Ouham 
(1), Ouham Pende (2), Mambere Kadei 
(1), and Mbomou (1) districts. To 
interrupt wild poliovirus circulation, 8 
supplementary immunization activities 
were organized.
The 2011 polio outbreak occurred 
in the district of Ouham and was 
caused by WPV1 poliovirus imported 
from southern Chad (Figure). 
Fourteen additional cases of AFP 
were classified as polio-compatible; 
these occurred in Ouham-Pende (6), 
Ouham (1), Ombela M’Poko (1), 
Kemo (1), Ouaka (1), Haute Kotto (2), 
and Mbomou (2) districts. Routine 
OPV coverage for this insecure and 
difficult-to-access region was 55% for 
2010 and 58% for 2011.
CAR is one of the countries with 
the highest predicted risk for WPV 
circulation after importation (9). The 
3 WPV importation events we report 
demonstrate that current immunization 
levels in this country are insufficient 
to guard against polio. High, sustained 
levels of routine OPV coverage in 
every district, supplemented by high-
quality supplementary immunization 
activities, will help prevent future 
outbreaks. Surveillance standards 
must also be maintained to ensure the 
rapid detection of WPV importation, 
thus enabling timely response and 
containment.
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